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From Royal Marines from 1664 to present.
The 1797 mutinies involved Marines by default, though the nature of their involvement has been debated. In previous, more individual, insurrections, Marines did their duty to their ship, such as in 1779. HMS Defiance's crew refused to sail with Maximillian Jacobs, with the claim that he had flogged fifty men for 'mere trifles':
During this incident, the Marines stood by, their muskets loaded, but their intervention was fortunately unnecessary.
During the 1797 mutinies, it is generally believed by early Corps historians that the Marines were similarly loyal. Gillespie wrote about "The steady faithfulness of all those Marine soldiers who had served during the American War", with their "unshaken resolve to stand or fall with their officers". Field suggested that, well-handled, the Marine Corps might have "reduced the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore to a mere flash in the pan". He cites the refusal of HMS Agammemnon's captain to use his Marines "because some of them would be shot, and he could not endure seeing them lying suffering on the deck".2
It is unlikely that the Marines themselves felt adherence to duty as a greater calling, however. They, like the seamen, had not known an increase in pay since the 1660s, and indeed the Spithead mutineers included the Marines in their demands, referring to them as "our brethren the Marines” and insisting on their inclusion in a pay raise.3
Many believed the mutinies were supported by outside influences. One captain called the outbreaks “perfectly French”.4 In reality, no trace of interference existed. The mutinying seamen behaved themselves largely with discipline, committing no violence upon their officers and stating they would fight if the French put to sea.
Lieutenant Mortimer Timpson, of HMS Montague, remained aboard throughout the Nore mutiny, alongside his captain, and both were “allowed our liberty and permitted to walk the quarter deck without any insult or molestation”. Only the ship’s surgeon received any ill attention, when he was tarred and feathered, using handfuls of feathers from a pillow, “as you would flour a piece of roasting beef with flour dredge... even to the clocks of his stockings”.5
There was nearly great violence earlier aboard Montague, however. The cheering ship’s crew loaded and pointed guns aft, to which the Marines responded by lining both sides of the lower deck with loaded muskets. “The seamen were then ordered to restore the Guns to their places & told, that if they did not, we should fire on them: they obeyed and we were dismissed”. This stand against their shipmates proved to be a singular event. The next day, “Captain Knight found the whole of the Ship’s crew, together with the Marines, forward on the Lower Deck in a sate of mutiny and could get none of them to come aft to their duty.”6
After the American Revolution, the Marine Corps had been reduced to a mere 4,495 men. When war broke out with France, this number quadrupled. The result was that, in 1797, most Marines were young and inexperienced. The problem was reported to the First Lord, Earl Spencer, by a captain in Portsmouth:
Marine resistance to the mutiny was isolated and came from the NCOs. A corporal at Spithead was ducked twice but put ashore unharmed, for refusing to take the delegates’ oath. Sergeant Jenkins of HMS Monmouth, at the Nore, was flogged, receiving three dozen lashes and after had his head shaved, for keeping to his duty. Conversely, there were Sergeants Dunn, a Nore delegate, “whom they now call Captain of Marines” and Dickinson at Plymouth, who made a literate Marine aboard HMS Saturn copy out a mutinous oath.8
There was no symathy amongst Marine officers for the mutinies. At Spithead, Lieutenant Robyns endured “the mortifications of witnessing the state of anarchy and confusion of the fleet,” and “the disgraceful mutiny which is now happily subsided.”9
The men generally sided with the seamen, prompting Admiral Duncan at the Nore to report, “the Marines in most ships have joined the seamen”, as had happened at Spithead. In Pompee, “The Marines mixed with the Ships Company, and were equally forward in the business.” In Mars, Marines joined the mutineers when brought to the point of opposing their shipmates: “ordered under arms and on the word being given to prime and load they immediately lay down their arms and came forward to join the ship’s company.”10
Sea officers tended to avoid such confrontations, with one particular exception. On the 7th May, when the Spithead delegates attempted to board the London, Admiral Colpoys secured the ship against them, sending his crew below and posting Marines around the upper decks. The crew below became restless and Colpoys ordered his officers to fire down the gangways, which brought the seamen into fighting temper. They broke into the magazine and unlashed the middle deck guns, and received no opposition from the Marines, who threw down their arms to join them. Marine Lieutenant Simms and one of his men were wounded, with two of the Admiral’s party, while four or five seamen were killed. Colpoys was not pleased with the Marines’ conduct, claiming they “had given all reasons to suggest they meant to stand by us”, but “the premeditated murder” of unarmed seamen was too much for them to bear.11
The Spithead mutiny achieved all of its aims, including rises in pay for seamen and Marines, and changes in pursers’ measurements. The First Lord himself admitted “the wages were undoubtedly too low in proportion to the times” and showed surprised “that the purser’s deductions, and the system of short weights and measures depending on it, should have been so long tolerated.”12 Additionally, none of the Marines’ allowances ashore were to be stopped while they were at sea.
This left the Nore mutineers with conflicting objectives: “a different distribution of Prize Money - an alteration in their Provisions - That the ship should be docked &c &c: in short they hardly knew what they wanted.” Cohesion amongst the mutineers crumbled and men and ships began gradually returning to duty. HMS Montague was ordered to Portsmouth, where the mutiny’s ringleaders were court-martialled and her Marine detachment put ashore in favour of a fresh one. The experience did not, however, diminish Lieutenant Timpson’s confidence in his men:
The idea of separating Marines and seamen is credited to Lord St Vincent, but it predates the mutinies. In 1796, Admiral Knowles recommended that Marines should be “birthed Aft next the Gun room on both sides”.14 At the height of the Spithead mutiny, a captain wrote to Lord Spencer on the same subject:
Earl St Vincent, being Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, took action in this respect. He called his Captains of Marines together, “under the pretext of informing them about uniformity in dress, in exercise, and in economy: but really to give them some sense about keeping a watchful eye, not only upon their own men, but upon the seamen.” He enacted a deliberate policy of physically separating Marines from the seamen:
St Vincent took other steps to improve the status of his Marines. He directed officers of Marines to visit their men at their meals and keep up the pride and spirit of their detachments. A Quondam Sub had complained about Navy lieutenants undermining Marine discipline by”imposing on them such tasks, as sunk them in their own estimation, by insulting their military pride.”17 This was another thing St Vincent changed. He freed Marines from regular ships’ duties, enabling them to spend their time under their own officers’ supervision, with the exceptions of shifting anchors and getting under sail.
He also urged that the numbers of NCOs should be doubled in 74-gun ships, “that they may be relied on in case of any further attempt being made by the seditious to wrest control of His Majesty’s ships from the officers.”18 Further, he stressed formal discipline to overawe the impressionable. The uniformity of dress was enforced amongst the fleet’s Marine detachments, with each ship sending “one intelligent Sergeant and their Master Tailor to look at the pattern winter and summer regimentals, working jacket, hat, etc’, to the flagship. Each morning, St Vincent, in full dress, stood on deck and watched the guard mounted, “with all the form and order practised on the best regulated parades”, with the band played ‘God Save the King’ and the Guard presented arms, “with the respect and decorum due to the occasion”.19
The use of Irish was forbidden amongst the Marines after an unusual alliance of United Irishmen and conservative-minded captains opposed the separation of Marines and seamen. An Inspector of Marines was appointed to enforce the new policies. A retired admiral charged St Vincent with “completely overturning the natural order of things” with his efforts. It was believed that a military force could not enforce obedience at sea, because Marines would never challenge seamen, upon whom the safety of the ship depended. Further, Marines’ only ‘qualification’ was the ability to load and fire a musket, and many never acquired “what is called sea-legs and are therefore in great measure useless in bad weather at sea”. 20 This is plain nonsense, since Marines, like seamen, spent years at sea.
St Vincent’s efforts only put fresh steel into existing practises. Many sea officers were keen to support their Marines. Captain’s Orders for HMS Mars, in 1795, addressed the “general complaint that the marine officers do not possess sufficient authority and command over their own men when embarked” and gave them exclusive responsibility for “their interior economy as well as their prompt obedience and dispatch in coming upon deck and performing the public duty of the ship’. Further, there was a provision against
Thus, officers and NCOs of Marines became the primary channel for issuing orders to the men, “by which means the interference of the Boatswain and his mates may be less necessary”.22 Marine officers also learned to resent appeals against their authority. Measures intended “to prevent Drunkenness and Rioting” amongst Marines on the North American station were objected to, which in turn drew angry responses to the objections: “The Commanding Officer cannot avoid expressing his astonishment and displeasure at the conduct of those men of the Battalion who presumed to appeal from his decision to that of a Naval Officer.”23
The opinion of Marines amongst Navy officers was considerably warmer in these days than it had been in the 1690s, when a “Splenetick Gentleman” at the Admiralty supposedly referred to them as “Water Rats”.24 By contrast, the Naval Chronicle commented on “the admitted importance of this corps, than whom there are no better soldiers”.25
In 1802, at the Peace of Amiens, the strength of the Corps stood at 12,119, and was held there, thus keeping experienced men on the establishment. Officers in the Channel Fleet suggested that Marines provide a quarter of ship’s complements, replacing landsmen for most duties, and forming “the strongest possible barrier against internal irregularity.”26 By 1810, the number of Marines in a first-rate’s detachment had risen from 100 men, the number given in 1747, to 166 men. Further, the 1808 regulations reserved the Admiralty’s veto on Marines transferring to the Navy, thus implying they were now considered equal in value to seamen.27
Lord St Vincent never made it a secret that he was partial to the Marine Corps. He looked forward to the time “when there is not another foot soldier in the kingdom, in Ireland, or the Colonies, except the King’s Guards and Artillery”.28 His position as First Lord of the Admiralty enabled him to obtain for the Corps a Royal distinction, which was granted on the 29th April, 1802. The occasion was celebrated with grand festivities at the three Divisions’ Headquarters and likely aboard ships. The previous impractical white facings were replaced with dark blue, as befits a Royal regiment, and new uniforms were introduced. These were modelled on those of the First Foot Guards at His Majesty’s express command, and first appeared on the King’s birthday, the 4th June, 1802. The Plymouth battalion celebrated by firing volleys into the air, while the band played ‘God Save the King’, and three hearty cheers were given for His Majesty. It was “a most animating scene, as the Royal Corps of Marines, both in peace and war, have ever been considered by the nation at large as a family and constitutional corps.”29
Perhaps the best tribute, however, was given by Lord St Vincent at the end of his life:
3 1 - RM 11/13/093, Sgt John Howe, Mar 1779
4 2 - BSS/i pp. 187-8 & 194
5 3 - Delegates’ Reply to Admiralty Officer of 18 Apr 1797
6 4 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, ii, p. 113, 18 Apr 1797, Capt. J.W. Payne/Earl Spencer
7 5 - RM 7/9/1-17, Mortimer Timpson, pp. 6-8
8 6 - RM 7/9/1-17, Mortimer Timpson, pp. 2-4
9 7 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, ii, p. 113, 18 Apr 1797, Capt. J.W. Payne/Earl Spencer
10 8 - W.G. Perrin, Keith Papers, ii, p. 17, 13 Jun 1797, Examination of seamen at Sheerness; p. 28, 4 Aug 1797, Certificate of Good Conduct & p. 27; 5 Jul 1797, Keith/Adm. Sir R. King
11 9 - RM 11/13/061, Capt. John Robyns Diary, Jan-May 1797
12 10 - An Impartial Account of the Proceeding on Board HM Ship London, Tuesday, 7 May 1797 & ADM 1/107, Capt. Vashon to Bridport, 7 May 1797
13 11 - ADM 1/107 269, Colpoys to Evan Nepean, 8 May 1797 & RNM1996/ 8 19598 6.10.3, 13 May 1797, The Loyal and Humane Tars of His Majesty’s Fleet, at St. Helen’s
14 12 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, p. 399, 4 May 1797 Spencer/Sir John Jervis. Marine rates of pay were now:
15 13 - RM 7/9/1-17, Mortimer Timpson, pp. 9 & 13
16 14 - RNM 1996/31(38), Adm. Knowles’ Standing Orders 1796 #10
17 15 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, p. 119, 27 Apr 1797, Capt. Parr (Standard/Spencer)
18 16 - J.S. Tucker Memoirs of Earl Spencer (Bentley, 1844), i, pp. 297 & 329, 18 Jul 1797, St Vincent/Capt. Duckworth
19 17 - A Quondam Sub, p. iv
20 18 - Tucker, i, p. 340, 21 Aug 1798, St Vincent/Evan Nepean
21 19 - Lavery, pp. 219-22 & RR p. 93
22 20 - Lavery, pp. 633-4, Adm. Philip Patton, Strictures on Naval Discipline &c
24 21 - Lavery, pp. 238-9, Orders for the Officers of Marines, HMS Mars
25 22 - RM 11/13/89, Tatton Brown, #2; Lavery, p. 196, Captain’s Orders, HMS Indefatigable, 1812
26 23 - RM 7/713, Order Book, 1 Aug 1814
27 24 - Anonymous, to a Member of Parliament, p. 6
28 25 - NC v, p. 77
29 26 - J.K. Laughton, Barham Papers, p. 190, 1 Jun 1805, Nauticus/Barham
30 27 - Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea, 1808, pp. 421-2
31 28 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, p. 212, 30 Jun 1797, St Vincent/Spencer
32 29 - NC vii, p. 528
33 30 - BSS/i, p. 264
The 1797 mutinies involved Marines by default, though the nature of their involvement has been debated. In previous, more individual, insurrections, Marines did their duty to their ship, such as in 1779. HMS Defiance's crew refused to sail with Maximillian Jacobs, with the claim that he had flogged fifty men for 'mere trifles':
On which they all Calld out togeather. Another Captain. No Jacobs. No Jacobs. and immediately got the foremost Gun on each side run in and Pointed aft these were brought as far as the fore hatchway when they Layd a bulwark of hammocks a Cross the ship to defend them from Small Shot that might be fired on them from aft.1
During this incident, the Marines stood by, their muskets loaded, but their intervention was fortunately unnecessary.
During the 1797 mutinies, it is generally believed by early Corps historians that the Marines were similarly loyal. Gillespie wrote about "The steady faithfulness of all those Marine soldiers who had served during the American War", with their "unshaken resolve to stand or fall with their officers". Field suggested that, well-handled, the Marine Corps might have "reduced the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore to a mere flash in the pan". He cites the refusal of HMS Agammemnon's captain to use his Marines "because some of them would be shot, and he could not endure seeing them lying suffering on the deck".2
It is unlikely that the Marines themselves felt adherence to duty as a greater calling, however. They, like the seamen, had not known an increase in pay since the 1660s, and indeed the Spithead mutineers included the Marines in their demands, referring to them as "our brethren the Marines” and insisting on their inclusion in a pay raise.3
Many believed the mutinies were supported by outside influences. One captain called the outbreaks “perfectly French”.4 In reality, no trace of interference existed. The mutinying seamen behaved themselves largely with discipline, committing no violence upon their officers and stating they would fight if the French put to sea.
Lieutenant Mortimer Timpson, of HMS Montague, remained aboard throughout the Nore mutiny, alongside his captain, and both were “allowed our liberty and permitted to walk the quarter deck without any insult or molestation”. Only the ship’s surgeon received any ill attention, when he was tarred and feathered, using handfuls of feathers from a pillow, “as you would flour a piece of roasting beef with flour dredge... even to the clocks of his stockings”.5
There was nearly great violence earlier aboard Montague, however. The cheering ship’s crew loaded and pointed guns aft, to which the Marines responded by lining both sides of the lower deck with loaded muskets. “The seamen were then ordered to restore the Guns to their places & told, that if they did not, we should fire on them: they obeyed and we were dismissed”. This stand against their shipmates proved to be a singular event. The next day, “Captain Knight found the whole of the Ship’s crew, together with the Marines, forward on the Lower Deck in a sate of mutiny and could get none of them to come aft to their duty.”6
After the American Revolution, the Marine Corps had been reduced to a mere 4,495 men. When war broke out with France, this number quadrupled. The result was that, in 1797, most Marines were young and inexperienced. The problem was reported to the First Lord, Earl Spencer, by a captain in Portsmouth:
No reliance can be placed on the Marines, who are recruits, and never had any habits of military life or discipline from the seamen, [who] are one class with them. This is one of the evils of keeping the establishment of the corps so low in peace.7
Marine resistance to the mutiny was isolated and came from the NCOs. A corporal at Spithead was ducked twice but put ashore unharmed, for refusing to take the delegates’ oath. Sergeant Jenkins of HMS Monmouth, at the Nore, was flogged, receiving three dozen lashes and after had his head shaved, for keeping to his duty. Conversely, there were Sergeants Dunn, a Nore delegate, “whom they now call Captain of Marines” and Dickinson at Plymouth, who made a literate Marine aboard HMS Saturn copy out a mutinous oath.8
There was no symathy amongst Marine officers for the mutinies. At Spithead, Lieutenant Robyns endured “the mortifications of witnessing the state of anarchy and confusion of the fleet,” and “the disgraceful mutiny which is now happily subsided.”9
The men generally sided with the seamen, prompting Admiral Duncan at the Nore to report, “the Marines in most ships have joined the seamen”, as had happened at Spithead. In Pompee, “The Marines mixed with the Ships Company, and were equally forward in the business.” In Mars, Marines joined the mutineers when brought to the point of opposing their shipmates: “ordered under arms and on the word being given to prime and load they immediately lay down their arms and came forward to join the ship’s company.”10
Sea officers tended to avoid such confrontations, with one particular exception. On the 7th May, when the Spithead delegates attempted to board the London, Admiral Colpoys secured the ship against them, sending his crew below and posting Marines around the upper decks. The crew below became restless and Colpoys ordered his officers to fire down the gangways, which brought the seamen into fighting temper. They broke into the magazine and unlashed the middle deck guns, and received no opposition from the Marines, who threw down their arms to join them. Marine Lieutenant Simms and one of his men were wounded, with two of the Admiral’s party, while four or five seamen were killed. Colpoys was not pleased with the Marines’ conduct, claiming they “had given all reasons to suggest they meant to stand by us”, but “the premeditated murder” of unarmed seamen was too much for them to bear.11
The Spithead mutiny achieved all of its aims, including rises in pay for seamen and Marines, and changes in pursers’ measurements. The First Lord himself admitted “the wages were undoubtedly too low in proportion to the times” and showed surprised “that the purser’s deductions, and the system of short weights and measures depending on it, should have been so long tolerated.”12 Additionally, none of the Marines’ allowances ashore were to be stopped while they were at sea.
This left the Nore mutineers with conflicting objectives: “a different distribution of Prize Money - an alteration in their Provisions - That the ship should be docked &c &c: in short they hardly knew what they wanted.” Cohesion amongst the mutineers crumbled and men and ships began gradually returning to duty. HMS Montague was ordered to Portsmouth, where the mutiny’s ringleaders were court-martialled and her Marine detachment put ashore in favour of a fresh one. The experience did not, however, diminish Lieutenant Timpson’s confidence in his men:
I must say that the Marines, in the first instance, behaved as well as men could do, and, I am sure, that it was not without great difficulty and much persuasion, that they were at last induced to join the Mutiny; had they been kept to themselves, after the first outbreak, the result might very probably have been different.13
The idea of separating Marines and seamen is credited to Lord St Vincent, but it predates the mutinies. In 1796, Admiral Knowles recommended that Marines should be “birthed Aft next the Gun room on both sides”.14 At the height of the Spithead mutiny, a captain wrote to Lord Spencer on the same subject:
The Marines have ever been a separate body from the seamen. I have never known an instance of their having been concurred in a mutiny... and they are men which we look to in general for protection in such disagreeable situations; therefore, the fear of separating the Marines and seamen, is rather to be courted than dreaded.15
Earl St Vincent, being Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, took action in this respect. He called his Captains of Marines together, “under the pretext of informing them about uniformity in dress, in exercise, and in economy: but really to give them some sense about keeping a watchful eye, not only upon their own men, but upon the seamen.” He enacted a deliberate policy of physically separating Marines from the seamen:
to this effect I directed that in the ships of three decks, they should be berthed in the after part of the middle deck; and in those of two decks, close to the bulkhead of the gun rooms, or to the officers’ cabins before it, giving them the two after berths on each side, from one side of the ship to the other, that they might not be burst in on.16
St Vincent took other steps to improve the status of his Marines. He directed officers of Marines to visit their men at their meals and keep up the pride and spirit of their detachments. A Quondam Sub had complained about Navy lieutenants undermining Marine discipline by”imposing on them such tasks, as sunk them in their own estimation, by insulting their military pride.”17 This was another thing St Vincent changed. He freed Marines from regular ships’ duties, enabling them to spend their time under their own officers’ supervision, with the exceptions of shifting anchors and getting under sail.
He also urged that the numbers of NCOs should be doubled in 74-gun ships, “that they may be relied on in case of any further attempt being made by the seditious to wrest control of His Majesty’s ships from the officers.”18 Further, he stressed formal discipline to overawe the impressionable. The uniformity of dress was enforced amongst the fleet’s Marine detachments, with each ship sending “one intelligent Sergeant and their Master Tailor to look at the pattern winter and summer regimentals, working jacket, hat, etc’, to the flagship. Each morning, St Vincent, in full dress, stood on deck and watched the guard mounted, “with all the form and order practised on the best regulated parades”, with the band played ‘God Save the King’ and the Guard presented arms, “with the respect and decorum due to the occasion”.19
The use of Irish was forbidden amongst the Marines after an unusual alliance of United Irishmen and conservative-minded captains opposed the separation of Marines and seamen. An Inspector of Marines was appointed to enforce the new policies. A retired admiral charged St Vincent with “completely overturning the natural order of things” with his efforts. It was believed that a military force could not enforce obedience at sea, because Marines would never challenge seamen, upon whom the safety of the ship depended. Further, Marines’ only ‘qualification’ was the ability to load and fire a musket, and many never acquired “what is called sea-legs and are therefore in great measure useless in bad weather at sea”. 20 This is plain nonsense, since Marines, like seamen, spent years at sea.
St Vincent’s efforts only put fresh steel into existing practises. Many sea officers were keen to support their Marines. Captain’s Orders for HMS Mars, in 1795, addressed the “general complaint that the marine officers do not possess sufficient authority and command over their own men when embarked” and gave them exclusive responsibility for “their interior economy as well as their prompt obedience and dispatch in coming upon deck and performing the public duty of the ship’. Further, there was a provision against
improper interference on the part of the naval officers of the ship... as they have only to acquaint the officers of marines upon duty what neglect he discovers and what is necessary to be done and he will order his sergeant etc to see it executed.21
Thus, officers and NCOs of Marines became the primary channel for issuing orders to the men, “by which means the interference of the Boatswain and his mates may be less necessary”.22 Marine officers also learned to resent appeals against their authority. Measures intended “to prevent Drunkenness and Rioting” amongst Marines on the North American station were objected to, which in turn drew angry responses to the objections: “The Commanding Officer cannot avoid expressing his astonishment and displeasure at the conduct of those men of the Battalion who presumed to appeal from his decision to that of a Naval Officer.”23
The opinion of Marines amongst Navy officers was considerably warmer in these days than it had been in the 1690s, when a “Splenetick Gentleman” at the Admiralty supposedly referred to them as “Water Rats”.24 By contrast, the Naval Chronicle commented on “the admitted importance of this corps, than whom there are no better soldiers”.25
In 1802, at the Peace of Amiens, the strength of the Corps stood at 12,119, and was held there, thus keeping experienced men on the establishment. Officers in the Channel Fleet suggested that Marines provide a quarter of ship’s complements, replacing landsmen for most duties, and forming “the strongest possible barrier against internal irregularity.”26 By 1810, the number of Marines in a first-rate’s detachment had risen from 100 men, the number given in 1747, to 166 men. Further, the 1808 regulations reserved the Admiralty’s veto on Marines transferring to the Navy, thus implying they were now considered equal in value to seamen.27
Lord St Vincent never made it a secret that he was partial to the Marine Corps. He looked forward to the time “when there is not another foot soldier in the kingdom, in Ireland, or the Colonies, except the King’s Guards and Artillery”.28 His position as First Lord of the Admiralty enabled him to obtain for the Corps a Royal distinction, which was granted on the 29th April, 1802. The occasion was celebrated with grand festivities at the three Divisions’ Headquarters and likely aboard ships. The previous impractical white facings were replaced with dark blue, as befits a Royal regiment, and new uniforms were introduced. These were modelled on those of the First Foot Guards at His Majesty’s express command, and first appeared on the King’s birthday, the 4th June, 1802. The Plymouth battalion celebrated by firing volleys into the air, while the band played ‘God Save the King’, and three hearty cheers were given for His Majesty. It was “a most animating scene, as the Royal Corps of Marines, both in peace and war, have ever been considered by the nation at large as a family and constitutional corps.”29
Perhaps the best tribute, however, was given by Lord St Vincent at the end of his life:
In obtaining for them the distinction of “Royal” I but inefficiently did my duty. I have never known an appeal made to them for honour, courage, or loyalty that they did not more than realize my highest expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should come to England they will be found the country’s sheet anchor.30
3 1 - RM 11/13/093, Sgt John Howe, Mar 1779
4 2 - BSS/i pp. 187-8 & 194
5 3 - Delegates’ Reply to Admiralty Officer of 18 Apr 1797
6 4 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, ii, p. 113, 18 Apr 1797, Capt. J.W. Payne/Earl Spencer
7 5 - RM 7/9/1-17, Mortimer Timpson, pp. 6-8
8 6 - RM 7/9/1-17, Mortimer Timpson, pp. 2-4
9 7 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, ii, p. 113, 18 Apr 1797, Capt. J.W. Payne/Earl Spencer
10 8 - W.G. Perrin, Keith Papers, ii, p. 17, 13 Jun 1797, Examination of seamen at Sheerness; p. 28, 4 Aug 1797, Certificate of Good Conduct & p. 27; 5 Jul 1797, Keith/Adm. Sir R. King
11 9 - RM 11/13/061, Capt. John Robyns Diary, Jan-May 1797
12 10 - An Impartial Account of the Proceeding on Board HM Ship London, Tuesday, 7 May 1797 & ADM 1/107, Capt. Vashon to Bridport, 7 May 1797
13 11 - ADM 1/107 269, Colpoys to Evan Nepean, 8 May 1797 & RNM1996/ 8 19598 6.10.3, 13 May 1797, The Loyal and Humane Tars of His Majesty’s Fleet, at St. Helen’s
14 12 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, p. 399, 4 May 1797 Spencer/Sir John Jervis. Marine rates of pay were now:
Sergeant Corporal Drummer Private To 25 July 1797 on shore 1/6d 1/ - 1/ - 8d -do- at sea 1/ - 8d 8d 6d
15 13 - RM 7/9/1-17, Mortimer Timpson, pp. 9 & 13
16 14 - RNM 1996/31(38), Adm. Knowles’ Standing Orders 1796 #10
17 15 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, p. 119, 27 Apr 1797, Capt. Parr (Standard/Spencer)
18 16 - J.S. Tucker Memoirs of Earl Spencer (Bentley, 1844), i, pp. 297 & 329, 18 Jul 1797, St Vincent/Capt. Duckworth
19 17 - A Quondam Sub, p. iv
20 18 - Tucker, i, p. 340, 21 Aug 1798, St Vincent/Evan Nepean
21 19 - Lavery, pp. 219-22 & RR p. 93
22 20 - Lavery, pp. 633-4, Adm. Philip Patton, Strictures on Naval Discipline &c
24 21 - Lavery, pp. 238-9, Orders for the Officers of Marines, HMS Mars
25 22 - RM 11/13/89, Tatton Brown, #2; Lavery, p. 196, Captain’s Orders, HMS Indefatigable, 1812
26 23 - RM 7/713, Order Book, 1 Aug 1814
27 24 - Anonymous, to a Member of Parliament, p. 6
28 25 - NC v, p. 77
29 26 - J.K. Laughton, Barham Papers, p. 190, 1 Jun 1805, Nauticus/Barham
30 27 - Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea, 1808, pp. 421-2
31 28 - Corbett, Spencer Papers, p. 212, 30 Jun 1797, St Vincent/Spencer
32 29 - NC vii, p. 528
33 30 - BSS/i, p. 264
