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From The Royal Marines 1664 to the present.
The training of Marines was a great deal simpler than that of the army, with regard to foot drill, but there was a great deal of difference in fighting at sea and fighting on land. Marines were constantly concerned with keeping powder dry and weapons serviceable, as well as being aware of the necessary alterations to make when firing to leeward or to windward. Marines were expected to take cover while reloading and also taking up alternative firing positions, “springing sideways with Life and Spirit’ and halting of their own accord, “so that... a Detachment will occupy any Part of the Deck in a Moment, without being troubled by tedious Movements”.
It was claimed that Marines required more officers than the army, “because they have more duties to learn, and a greater variety of difficulties to encounter”.
Marine officers required some knowledge of seamanship in order to anticipate the intentions of a ship’s captain, “and be ready with his Detachment to throw in his fire, as Circumstances may require... As a favourable Opportunity, if not immediately embraced, may often be lost”.
Further, Marines needed to know how to time their firings and movements with the motion of the ship, learning “never to give Fire but when the Ship is rising with the Wave: If you fire when she pitches, you hit nothing but Salt-Water.”
In action, Marines could prove critical, with their ability to provide concentrated small-arms fire. On the 5th January, 1795, HMS Blanche, 32, took the Pique, 38. “The Marines under Lieutenant Richardson keeping up so well-directed and constant a fire, that not a man could appear on the forecastle until she struck.”
Marines could also provide volley fire during fleet actions:
When in action, Marines were stationed on the foc’s’le and the poop deck, where they were afforded the best fields of fire. ‘In 1776 HMS Enterprise, a 6th Rate Frigate with 28 guns and 34 Marines, stationed 24 on the quarterdeck with the senior Lieutenant, Sergeant and drummer, and another 10 on the forecastle, with the Lieutenant and Corporal.’
At the first Battle of the Capes, John Howe “was Stationed on the forecastle with twelve Privates 2 Corporal 1 Serjent and one Lieutenant of Marines... they were all killed and wounded except myself and too Privats and the Lieu’.”
Marines were trained to keep tight control in their firings:
Against small targets, Marines still operated in groups. “A platoon of the best Marksmen should be picked out, and ordered to take Aim, and fire at the Port-Holes; Two or Three expert Men killed at a Gun may silence it for half an Hour.”
This was borne out during a frigate action on the 10th August, 1805, “one of the most brilliant and exemplary cases of the kind”, when Le Didon, 40, ran into the starboard quarter of HMS Phoenix, 36. Only a brass 32-pounder, aboard Didon, could be brought to bear, but no French sailor who attempted to fire it survived the determined fire of Phoenix’s Marines. Years after the fact, Phoenix’s captain wrote to Marine Lieutenant Pleydell, who had been present:
‘Marines learned three distinct ways of delivering fire: Parapet Firings to leeward or windward, and, for more advanced students, the Marine Firing. Sailing ships heel over before the wind, giving a clear view to leeward, but exposing their deck to fire, so it was safer to engage to windward, but more difficult, as the roll of the ship exaggerated the height of the bulwark, obstructing the musketeer. Different drill formations emerged: two ranks to fire to leeward, and three when firing to windward. The two ranks kept as close as possible to the barricade, to exploit what cover it gave, and fired together by successive platoons.from left or right as most appropriate. The three ranks fired one whole rank at a time, the other two reloading under the cover of the bulwark. The Marine Firing allowed soldiers to reload kneeling down and fire in their own time. This was astonishingly liberal in a period that usually reduced soldiers to mindless automata. Raw Marines might blaze away aimlessly, but experienced men could be trusted to take cover at random musket shot, standing up by platoons to fire in their turn: “Every man having an object in view, Fires, without any Word of Command or waiting for the Rest, and kneels to load again”. The aim of all three Firings was to deliver a continual hail of musket balls to shake enemy morale. A detachment was not properly exercised until they could deliver four rounds a minute: “for nothing can gall an Enemy so much as a constant Fire, which intimidates the common People, and often puts it out of an Officer's power to re-animate them.”
Full volleys were only fired when raking an enemy ship, as in a broadside, or when the enemy made attempts to board. The latter was followed by a brisk bayonet charge. Fixing bayonets during a sea battle was not usual, as doing so was inconvenient. However:
The training of Marines was a great deal simpler than that of the army, with regard to foot drill, but there was a great deal of difference in fighting at sea and fighting on land. Marines were constantly concerned with keeping powder dry and weapons serviceable, as well as being aware of the necessary alterations to make when firing to leeward or to windward. Marines were expected to take cover while reloading and also taking up alternative firing positions, “springing sideways with Life and Spirit’ and halting of their own accord, “so that... a Detachment will occupy any Part of the Deck in a Moment, without being troubled by tedious Movements”.
It was claimed that Marines required more officers than the army, “because they have more duties to learn, and a greater variety of difficulties to encounter”.
Marine officers required some knowledge of seamanship in order to anticipate the intentions of a ship’s captain, “and be ready with his Detachment to throw in his fire, as Circumstances may require... As a favourable Opportunity, if not immediately embraced, may often be lost”.
Further, Marines needed to know how to time their firings and movements with the motion of the ship, learning “never to give Fire but when the Ship is rising with the Wave: If you fire when she pitches, you hit nothing but Salt-Water.”
An Encampment in the Neighbourhood of the Enemy, or a rolling Ship of War, in the Bay of Biscay, are very improper Places to teach Men their Firings and Evolutions; therefore, they ought to know both perfectly before they are sent upon Service. It cannot be expected that Soldiers will perform in Action what they never saw in a Field of Exercise.
In action, Marines could prove critical, with their ability to provide concentrated small-arms fire. On the 5th January, 1795, HMS Blanche, 32, took the Pique, 38. “The Marines under Lieutenant Richardson keeping up so well-directed and constant a fire, that not a man could appear on the forecastle until she struck.”
Marines could also provide volley fire during fleet actions:
We were [given] the order to go on the Poop now the Province and the Ardent came down on us and Got on the Larboard bow whilst the Ardent went under our Stern and Did us a Deal of Damage one Shot Struck the mans firelock all to peaces that was in front of me and Cut away my Sidebolt and a Peace of my Coat. We were now drawn up a Cross the Taffrell to fire with our small arms into her.
When in action, Marines were stationed on the foc’s’le and the poop deck, where they were afforded the best fields of fire. ‘In 1776 HMS Enterprise, a 6th Rate Frigate with 28 guns and 34 Marines, stationed 24 on the quarterdeck with the senior Lieutenant, Sergeant and drummer, and another 10 on the forecastle, with the Lieutenant and Corporal.’
At the first Battle of the Capes, John Howe “was Stationed on the forecastle with twelve Privates 2 Corporal 1 Serjent and one Lieutenant of Marines... they were all killed and wounded except myself and too Privats and the Lieu’.”
Marines were trained to keep tight control in their firings:
see the Shot well rammed down; that the Men take a good Aim, level well, without trembling; direct their Fire where it is likely to do the most Execution; pull the Triggers very strong, and look boldly into their Fire, without turning the Head; they must never be suffered to fire at random, or in a Hurry; for it is certain that the Discharge of one Rank, loaded methodically, and who take Aim, does more Execution than three Discharges of the same number of Men, loading and firing at random.
Against small targets, Marines still operated in groups. “A platoon of the best Marksmen should be picked out, and ordered to take Aim, and fire at the Port-Holes; Two or Three expert Men killed at a Gun may silence it for half an Hour.”
This was borne out during a frigate action on the 10th August, 1805, “one of the most brilliant and exemplary cases of the kind”, when Le Didon, 40, ran into the starboard quarter of HMS Phoenix, 36. Only a brass 32-pounder, aboard Didon, could be brought to bear, but no French sailor who attempted to fire it survived the determined fire of Phoenix’s Marines. Years after the fact, Phoenix’s captain wrote to Marine Lieutenant Pleydell, who had been present:
Never can I forget the service you were to me, when the success of the battle [...] depended, a good deal, upon your example and conduct, and prevented that large piece of artillery on the forecastle of Didon from sweeping the whole of our deck.
‘Marines learned three distinct ways of delivering fire: Parapet Firings to leeward or windward, and, for more advanced students, the Marine Firing. Sailing ships heel over before the wind, giving a clear view to leeward, but exposing their deck to fire, so it was safer to engage to windward, but more difficult, as the roll of the ship exaggerated the height of the bulwark, obstructing the musketeer. Different drill formations emerged: two ranks to fire to leeward, and three when firing to windward. The two ranks kept as close as possible to the barricade, to exploit what cover it gave, and fired together by successive platoons.from left or right as most appropriate. The three ranks fired one whole rank at a time, the other two reloading under the cover of the bulwark. The Marine Firing allowed soldiers to reload kneeling down and fire in their own time. This was astonishingly liberal in a period that usually reduced soldiers to mindless automata. Raw Marines might blaze away aimlessly, but experienced men could be trusted to take cover at random musket shot, standing up by platoons to fire in their turn: “Every man having an object in view, Fires, without any Word of Command or waiting for the Rest, and kneels to load again”. The aim of all three Firings was to deliver a continual hail of musket balls to shake enemy morale. A detachment was not properly exercised until they could deliver four rounds a minute: “for nothing can gall an Enemy so much as a constant Fire, which intimidates the common People, and often puts it out of an Officer's power to re-animate them.”
Full volleys were only fired when raking an enemy ship, as in a broadside, or when the enemy made attempts to board. The latter was followed by a brisk bayonet charge. Fixing bayonets during a sea battle was not usual, as doing so was inconvenient. However:
If the enemy, either by design or accident, fall on board His Majesty's ship, the officers will order their men to fix bayonets to repulse them, if they should attempt to board, or to cover or protect our boarding party if they should be obliged to retreat.
