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hm_jollies2012-07-12 10:05 am
wayward_shadows) wrote in hm_jollies2012-07-12 10:05 am
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The Royal Marine Artillery
From Royal Marines 1664 to the present
The nature of the Navy and its polices of recruitment lent itself to difficulties maintaining experienced seaman gunners. There were attempts to ease this difficulty prior to 1804. In 1761, a proposal by a cavalry officer suggested using demobilised Royal Artillery men in place of naval quartergunners, "who having no education or instruction until they are pressed and carried aboard Ships of War, are by no means equal to these men, regularly trained in the use of great guns". In the 1770s it was proposed that Marine barracks should have a battery with gunports and sea service guns, and "The people to be constantly exercised with their guns in firing shot at a Target."
Similarly, Admiral Kempenfedlt wrote that "it would be a great service to the Navy by rendering the Corps of Marines more useful, if they were trained to the management of artillery ashore, as in action it is generally necessary to quarter a part of them to the guns." This idea was put forth afresh by Sir James Saumarez in 1796, but Lord Spencer was obliged, by financial difficulties, to dismiss it as a notion "well worthy of attention... which at a less pressing moment it might be worthwhile to renew".1
It would be the employment of soldiers aboard ships that would eventually decide the matter. Admiral Keppel, in 1778, expressed his preference for untrained Marines over soldiers: "indeed they would have been raw and untrained... but yet as men really belonging to the fleet they must be more desirable."2
In the 1790s, the use of soldiers as Marines was the cause of much friction. The support of military appeals against naval courts martial, given by government law officers, caused, amongst other expressions of disapproval, Lord Cornwallis to haul down his flag. The result of the protests was the removal of soldiers from all HM ships save bomb vessels. Only Royal Artillery detachments remained in these, to man the mortars.
Trouble persisted, however. The use of the Artillerymen in mundane daily ship's work and the Army's objections to summary punishment made for an uneasy state of affairs. Lord Nelson had particular feelings on the subject:
Perhaps the last straw for this matter came during a bombardment of Le Havre, when Artillerymen refused to do any other work except serve the mortars.
An Order in Council, dated 18 August 1804, established a company of Royal Marine Artillery at each Division. Each company was comprised of nine officers, twenty-one NCOs and drummers, and sixty-two gunners, and these were selected from the most intelligent and experienced officers and men from each Division.
It took some time to work out the wrinkles for this new branch. The Board of Ordnance did not consider that any part of the Field Train applied to the naval service and refused to supply any more than a single field gun, "with which it being impossible to perform any evolution, they are neither able to perfect themselves in their profession, nor even to preserve that state of improvement to which they had arrived".4
Even when the Admiralty was successful in obtaining guns from Ordnance officials, the Marines themselves had to improvise the necessaries for maintaining them. At Chatham, the gunners had to build their own storage sheds in a disused chalk pit, with timber begged from the Dockyard.
There was also the matter of bomb vessel commanders using their RMA detachments as stepping-stones to recognition. Lieutenant Robert Steele RMA was passed over for promotion twice after directing the fire of HM Bomb Etna at the Basque Roads and Flushing. However,
Ironically, official neglect resulted in disciplined self-sufficiency. An example of this occurred in the War of 1812, when the men of the RMA present refused to take part in the sack of Hampton, stating they were picked men and would not disgrace themselves. Their conduct earned them praise from Charles Napier: "Never in my life have I met soldiers like the Marine Artillery. We suffered much fatigue and hardship, but never was seen anything not admirable from these glorious soldiers." 6
The RMA saw action across Europe, from Sicily to Riga, and a small detachment was even present at Leipzig in 1813.
The RMA was not afraid to employ new weapons. In 1804, they used Fulton's torpedoes and Congreve's rockets in action against French flotillas. At Cadiz, General Graham asked for mortars and rockets, and desired "the expediency of sending these with some officers and men of the Royal Marine Artillery trained to the use of these weapons."7
Attacking French batteries from open-decked bomb vessels had its dangers. A single round shot from a French shore battery killed two RMA lieutenants but missed the midshipman standing between them. In another instance, a red-hot shot came in through the filling room bulkhead of HM Bomb Howard and landed amongst the powder. Gunner John Collard RMA reached for a fire bucket and emptied it over both.
In 1813, an RMA field battery comprised part of a Marine battalion sent to Holland, and took along their old practise guns: six 6-pounders and two 51/2 inch howitzers. One of these 6-pounders proved vital at Krabbendyke, in South Beveland, when it alternated between firing grape shot and changing its position, with its wounded commander perched upon the limber.
1 - E. Fraser & L.G. Carr Laughton, The Royal Marine Artillery, i, pp, 10-12; Col. Campbell Dalrymple KDG; Gen. Desaguliers RA; 13 Oct 1779, Kempenfeldt/Sir C. Middleton
2 - Sandwich Papers ii, p. 119
3 - Fraser & Carr Laughton, i, p. 21, 25 May 1804, Nelson/Capt. Sir T. Troubridge
4 - BSS/i, p. 264
5 - Steele, i p. 164
6 - BSS/i, p. 265, Gen Sir Charles James Napier
7 - Fraser & Carr Laughton, i, p. 129
The nature of the Navy and its polices of recruitment lent itself to difficulties maintaining experienced seaman gunners. There were attempts to ease this difficulty prior to 1804. In 1761, a proposal by a cavalry officer suggested using demobilised Royal Artillery men in place of naval quartergunners, "who having no education or instruction until they are pressed and carried aboard Ships of War, are by no means equal to these men, regularly trained in the use of great guns". In the 1770s it was proposed that Marine barracks should have a battery with gunports and sea service guns, and "The people to be constantly exercised with their guns in firing shot at a Target."
Similarly, Admiral Kempenfedlt wrote that "it would be a great service to the Navy by rendering the Corps of Marines more useful, if they were trained to the management of artillery ashore, as in action it is generally necessary to quarter a part of them to the guns." This idea was put forth afresh by Sir James Saumarez in 1796, but Lord Spencer was obliged, by financial difficulties, to dismiss it as a notion "well worthy of attention... which at a less pressing moment it might be worthwhile to renew".1
It would be the employment of soldiers aboard ships that would eventually decide the matter. Admiral Keppel, in 1778, expressed his preference for untrained Marines over soldiers: "indeed they would have been raw and untrained... but yet as men really belonging to the fleet they must be more desirable."2
In the 1790s, the use of soldiers as Marines was the cause of much friction. The support of military appeals against naval courts martial, given by government law officers, caused, amongst other expressions of disapproval, Lord Cornwallis to haul down his flag. The result of the protests was the removal of soldiers from all HM ships save bomb vessels. Only Royal Artillery detachments remained in these, to man the mortars.
Trouble persisted, however. The use of the Artillerymen in mundane daily ship's work and the Army's objections to summary punishment made for an uneasy state of affairs. Lord Nelson had particular feelings on the subject:
Let them once gain the step of being independent of the Navy on board a Ship, and they will soon have the other and command us... it would embitter my future days and expiring moments, to hear of our Navy being sacrificed to the Army.3
Perhaps the last straw for this matter came during a bombardment of Le Havre, when Artillerymen refused to do any other work except serve the mortars.
An Order in Council, dated 18 August 1804, established a company of Royal Marine Artillery at each Division. Each company was comprised of nine officers, twenty-one NCOs and drummers, and sixty-two gunners, and these were selected from the most intelligent and experienced officers and men from each Division.
It took some time to work out the wrinkles for this new branch. The Board of Ordnance did not consider that any part of the Field Train applied to the naval service and refused to supply any more than a single field gun, "with which it being impossible to perform any evolution, they are neither able to perfect themselves in their profession, nor even to preserve that state of improvement to which they had arrived".4
Even when the Admiralty was successful in obtaining guns from Ordnance officials, the Marines themselves had to improvise the necessaries for maintaining them. At Chatham, the gunners had to build their own storage sheds in a disused chalk pit, with timber begged from the Dockyard.
There was also the matter of bomb vessel commanders using their RMA detachments as stepping-stones to recognition. Lieutenant Robert Steele RMA was passed over for promotion twice after directing the fire of HM Bomb Etna at the Basque Roads and Flushing. However,
The commander of the vessel as compared with the commander of the artillery, in a bomb, stands in the relative position of the fly upon the coach wheel, when he says to his companion in rotary motion, "what a devil of a dust you and I kick up."5
Ironically, official neglect resulted in disciplined self-sufficiency. An example of this occurred in the War of 1812, when the men of the RMA present refused to take part in the sack of Hampton, stating they were picked men and would not disgrace themselves. Their conduct earned them praise from Charles Napier: "Never in my life have I met soldiers like the Marine Artillery. We suffered much fatigue and hardship, but never was seen anything not admirable from these glorious soldiers." 6
The RMA saw action across Europe, from Sicily to Riga, and a small detachment was even present at Leipzig in 1813.
The RMA was not afraid to employ new weapons. In 1804, they used Fulton's torpedoes and Congreve's rockets in action against French flotillas. At Cadiz, General Graham asked for mortars and rockets, and desired "the expediency of sending these with some officers and men of the Royal Marine Artillery trained to the use of these weapons."7
Attacking French batteries from open-decked bomb vessels had its dangers. A single round shot from a French shore battery killed two RMA lieutenants but missed the midshipman standing between them. In another instance, a red-hot shot came in through the filling room bulkhead of HM Bomb Howard and landed amongst the powder. Gunner John Collard RMA reached for a fire bucket and emptied it over both.
In 1813, an RMA field battery comprised part of a Marine battalion sent to Holland, and took along their old practise guns: six 6-pounders and two 51/2 inch howitzers. One of these 6-pounders proved vital at Krabbendyke, in South Beveland, when it alternated between firing grape shot and changing its position, with its wounded commander perched upon the limber.
1 - E. Fraser & L.G. Carr Laughton, The Royal Marine Artillery, i, pp, 10-12; Col. Campbell Dalrymple KDG; Gen. Desaguliers RA; 13 Oct 1779, Kempenfeldt/Sir C. Middleton
2 - Sandwich Papers ii, p. 119
3 - Fraser & Carr Laughton, i, p. 21, 25 May 1804, Nelson/Capt. Sir T. Troubridge
4 - BSS/i, p. 264
5 - Steele, i p. 164
6 - BSS/i, p. 265, Gen Sir Charles James Napier
7 - Fraser & Carr Laughton, i, p. 129